terrorism and it wishes to have the target designated across the EU. Two sets of cases, Kadi in respect of the Al-Qaida list, and OMPI/PMOI in respect of the general list, have afforded the EU courts the opportunity to consider the lawfulness of the designations and the processes by which individuals and entities are listed. 3 The courts have been robust in their review of EU action in this field -though the question to date has largely been limited to whether or not review should be undertaken. As no evidence has been presented to the EU institutions the ECJ has not yet dealt with the question of how to treat any secret evidence that forms the basis of the case against the targets.
Nevertheless, it is clear that EU law will soon have to grapple in a very real way with the question. It arises not only in the context of counter-terrorism sanctions, but also in sanctions in relation to a wide range of situations in international law (eg nuclear non-proliferation in Iran). This brief paper gives an exposition of the problem and a critical evaluation of one proposed solution -the UK system of special advocates. It cautions against the transplant of the flawed UK model into the EU system where, to date, the courts have robustly upheld the rule of law.
I. The Ongoing Kadi Saga
Following the decision of the European Court of Justice in Kadi I, Mr Kadi was provided with a one-page 'narrative summary' that purported to explain to him his designation under the UN Security Council system of sanctions. After (a brief) consideration of Mr Kadi's response to this letter the European Commission took the decision to maintain Mr Kadi's listing. The EU General Court gave short shrift to the European Commission's argument that this was sufficient to allow Mr Kadi to vindicate his due process rights -noting that the 
II. The Sharpston Opinion
In her Opinion Advocate General Sharpston notes that 'both the General Court and the General's summary in order for the requirements of the Convention to be satisfied, it is necessary that as much information about the allegations and evidence against each applicant be disclosed as is possible without compromising national security or the safety of others, that the party concerned be 'provided with sufficient information about the allegations against him to enable him to give effective instructions to the special advocate' and that 'any difficulties caused to the defendant by a limitation on his rights [be] sufficiently counterbalanced by the procedures followed by the judicial authorities'.
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Sharpston once again uses the term 'irreducible minimum requirement' in respect of the above principles. This is the high point of the Opinion as it confirms that at the very least the 'gist' of the evidence should be disclosed to the subject of the proceedings.
What is not clear from the Opinion is whether or not the Advocate General is endorsing a system of special advocates, as used in the UK, for EU courts. The only reference to special advocates is in a footnote to the Opinion. However, she appears to be cautiously accepting of the use of a special advocate system. The footnote sets out the operation of the system before observing that although 'the system has been adapted since its introduction in order to meet objections made, that does not mean that it is now without its critics'. While the Advocate General does acknowledge a report of the UK Parliament's Joint Committee on Human Rights that is highly critical of special advocates she emphasises that the criticisms 'relate essentially to the operation of the system rather than its core structure'. 14 Given that the system of special advocates has been in place since 1997 and is still, as recently as November 2011, the subject of severe criticism, it is difficult to accept it as a model for the EU. 15 A brief exposition of the problems with special advocates in closed hearings (called closed material proceedings in the UK) serves to demonstrate the reasons for caution.
III. The Problem with Special Advocates
In the UK, the use of special advocates in closed material proceedings has been the subject proceedings. At precisely the point at which the accused's participation is most important, both to ensure the legitimacy of the process and the effectiveness of counter-terrorism, he is excluded from the process. At that point, no matter how skilled or conscientious the special advocate is, he has become part of a system to which the accused is subject rather than in which the accused participates.
One reason for this is that special advocates cannot be held accountable to those whose interests they seek to represent. This restriction was introduced by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997, which introduced special advocates into UK law, and has been replicated in other statutes. Section 6(4) of the SIAC legislation states that the special advocate 'shall not be responsible to the person whose interests he is appointed to 23 However, because of the restrictions on their role nor are they an ordinary legal representative. As a result the relationship is not easily defined -which is a concern
give the severity of the interference with the rights of those subject to the proceedings.
Although the legal culture amongst special advocates may be respectful of the rule of law, that culture faces significant resistance from the UK Government. As it is the latter that ultimately decides on the rules of the closed material proceedings (through legislation) upholding the rule of law and cultivating a culture of legality it is in subjecting case law to critical appraisal so as to highlight problems with the law both as a system of rules and as it operates in broader context. The veil of secrecy over closed judgments makes such appraisal impossible and impoverishes the culture of legality as a result.
Third, special advocates do not have instructing solicitors in the usual manner. This places an onerous burden on the special advocate in preparing the case -in particular when they can no longer communicate with the individual that is the subject of the proceedings or his ordinary legal representatives. The problem has in part been resolved by the introduction of the Special Advocates Support Office. The Government has proposed that special advocates be offered 'sufficient resources in terms of independent junior legal support' in light of the likely extension of their use to more complex proceedings. 26 The difficulty in addressing the closed materials may be exacerbated by the late delivery of those materials -though the Government denies there is a systemic problem in this respect. 27 In addition, much of the time special advocates spend in closed proceedings is aimed at attempting to make more material openly available. This is a valuable role but it means that the material is not being challenged on substance -rather the special advocate is performing a form of meta-advocacy that may leave the case against the individual standing.
Fourth, on a related point, there are limits on the ability of a special advocate to challenge the national security evidence presented against those whose interests they are representing.
In the past special advocates were unable to call expert witnesses to challenge the state's evidence. While special advocates may now call expert witnesses they may not call current or former members of security agencies. There are further restrictions (security vetting) that would appear to limit the effectiveness of such witnesses for the special advocate. These restrictions indicate that no matter how skilled the special advocate he or she will face significant disadvantages in their effort to ensure that rule of law principles are upheld. The difficult choice faced by those who operate the legal system is whether or not to co-operate with a system that is ultimately contrary to the rule of law. Despite its problems the system of special advocates will be available in all civil litigation in the UK if the Justice and Security Bill 2012 becomes law. However, the above problems remain, and Advocate General Sharpston's musings on exporting the system to Europe does not suggest how they might be resolved.
IV. Exporting the Problems to Europe?
In many respects the problems for the EU in relation to special advocates may be even Commission is therefore a specialized tribunal with the appropriate competence to assess the claims made by intelligence services. It is difficult to see how the European judiciary, acting in the best possible faith, could be said to have these skills. Although the EU courts have expertise in dealing with complex sets of facts, such as in anti-trust litigation, they do not have a history of subjecting criminal justice evidence or security intelligence to scrutiny.
While the criticism that courts 'are in no position to act as risk assessors' 31 goes too far there is certainly a difficulty in requiring a de facto constitutional judiciary to assess evidence based on intelligence. The differences in the legal profession across the EU may also pose challenges. 32 There is no reason to believe that lawyers in the UK legal system are more skilled or more diligent in their pursuit of justice than lawyers in other legal systems.
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Nonetheless, experience may play a role. Because of the zealous pursuit of counter-terrorism by successive UK governments there are many advocates in that Member State with experience of dealing with secret evidence. The same may not be true of advocates from all Member States. It is therefore difficult to conceive of EU special advocates that could perform an equivalent role to special advocates in the UK.
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As a result of these limitations the proposal that the EU would adopt the UK model, even if the problems with that model could be solved, is not convincing. Thus, while some alteration to the Rules of Procedure for the General Court and the Court of Justice might be necessary, the use of special advocates does not seem advisable. A further question posed by the Sharpston Opinion relates to the current absence of any EU system for dealing with secret evidence. If the Advocate General endorses the principle in A v United Kingdom, then not only is she explicitly requiring disclosure of a gist of the evidence to the target of the sanctions, she may be implicitly requiring disclosure of the whole case to someone acting on his behalf (ie the special advocate). This system would likely cause the Council, or at least some of its members, such as France, much consternation. As it is the Council itself must approve any amendments to the Rules of Procedure there is the distinct possibility that a system could be adopted that is not favourable to applicants. devising the rules and applying them. However, it is difficult to disagree with the Advocate General's assessment that some action will have to be taken on this matter before too long.
V. Secret Evidence in Europe
It is clear that although Kadi remains the leading case it is by no means the whole story on sanctions in the EU. The proliferation of sanctions litigation is apparent from the case-list before the EU courts. The Kadi reasoning is being applied in new areas -extending the courts' counter-terrorism reasoning into the wider field of security law. Court Justice Aahron Barak is prescient in the current context: 'it is when the cannons roar that we especially need the laws… There is always law which the state must comply with.
There are no "black holes"'. 42 The Kadi I Opinion and Judgment represent a high watermark in the development of judicial protection. On the other hand, the UK system of special advocates was born from a desire to comply in the barest possible way with a decision of the European Court of Human Rights and has been corrosive for the culture of legality in that Member State. It would be a retrograde step, in a post-'war on terror'
world, 43 for the EU to adopt a system that has been the subject of such criticism within its home Member State.
VI. Conclusion: 'Force Yields Place to Law'
How then should the EU courts deal with secret evidence? The former UN Special but also about developing 'principles that go beyond these legally binding obligations'. In respect of the evidence used as the basis of designation for suspected terrorists best practice is said to require that sanctions are used where there are 'reasonable grounds' for belief that the individual or group has been involved in terrorism. In relation to judicial review 'best practice' requires that the target has the right to judicial review 'with due process rights applying to such review including disclosure of the case against him, her or it, and such rules concerning the burden of proof that are commensurate with the severity of the sanctions'.
The analysis in this paper suggests that the UK system of special advocates does not fulfil the requirements of best practice but that the EU system of judicial review may be developing in this direction -if the strong position taken to date endures. So long as the prevailing culture is one of control, or security, then formal rules will only ever serve to check but not eliminate threats to the rule of law. EU counter-terrorism is by no means above reproach. 45 However, the EU rule of law remains robust in the field of targeted sanctions. In the EU, in this field, 'force yields place to law'.
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Any consideration of EU law in the field of national security must recall that the EU is hardly a typical security actor. It has no army, navy, air force or police force. Nevertheless EU counter-terrorism law is a vibrant area of European law that is proving to be the focal point for the development of broader EU security law. The idea of European security is 'a complex constellation' which can be said to involve 'national cultures, institutional norms, political agendas, local perceptions and global needs'. At the heart of the project is 'an attempt to standardize and create a systematic juridical, institutional and technical approach to the threats that Europe faces today '. 47 This description by Burgess is an apt snapshot of the difficulty of describing European security or, as he puts it, European securities. The heterogeneity of the different EU systems and the different perceptions of security within Europe should caution against any attempt to crudely transplant a counter-terrorism power or safeguard from one Member State into another or, through the EU, into all other Member
States. Unless the special advocate system is proven to operate satisfactorily in its home
Member State the EU should seek another solution to the challenge of secret evidence. 45 On the contrary it demonstrates many of the traits of the pre-emptive shift. See Murphy, n 2 above. 
